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Abstract 
 
 
The main purpose of this article is to build on previous efforts to investigate the effects of Out-
ward-FDI promotion measures taken by governments and levels of outward foreign investment at 
regional level. We examine regional levels of outward FDI within Italy, a country with marketed 
regional asymmetries. Within the European arena, the heterogeneity of socio-economic condi-
tions among Italian regions is a clear example of intra-border imbalances. In fact, the different 
growth rates characterizing the various areas of Italy are far from being an exception in the Un-
ion, where diversity across member states is a reflection of domestic socio-economic disparities 
strongly concentrated in space and reproduced over time. The study allows also to investigate and 
to compare different types of incentives (financial and non-financial). Finally it provides evi-
dences on the non-policy factors that determine the spatial evolution of O-FDI projects, a theme 
deserving careful and close attention. 
For the empirical model we use information on the population of Italian firms that received in-
centives from 2000-2007. Data, aggregated at the regional level, refers to the major public tools 
implemented to promote Italian companies’ internationalization.  
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1. INTRODUCTION1 
There is a consensus among academics, policy makers and practitioners that as a result of the in-
tensifying globalization of the world's economies, internationalization of domestic companies has 
become increasingly important for the growth and long-term welfare of regions and countries 
around the world (Kitson et al., 2004; Kokko, 2006; Lipsey, 2002; UNCTAD, 2010)1.  
Behind the global scene one verifies that the sources of outward FDI are still much concentrated 
in few regions around the globe (UNCTAD, 2010), and that, within countries, many regions did 
not adapt easily to the new paradigm with their firms showing low levels of internationalization. 
Data at the country level for some of the largest European economies (e.g. in Spain see DataIn-
vex, and Boletim Economico 2002, for Italy see  Basile et al., 2003, and for the UK see O’Farrel 
et al., 1996) clearly reveal the asymmetries between sub-national regions regarding the interna-
tional activities of their firms. This is all the more worrying insofar as global processes and chal-
lenges are likely to strengthen the gap between regions. The idea of a “Europe of regions” has 
gained momentum, thus reinforcing the need of knowing more about geographical units smaller 
than the national states. However, a substantial body of research has sought to identify and ex-
plain international flows of capital investment, with relatively little effort expended on the sub-
national distribution of this investment. 
Accordingly to recent studies on the industrial districts tradition, regional international competi-
tiveness and determinants of internationalization, the region’s likelihood of achieving interna-
tional success depends to a large extant on structural and behavioural features of the regions 
themselves, which evolve slowly over time (Basile et al., 2003; Cooke and Morgan, 1998; 
                                                 
1 We acknowledge the support from the Italian Ministry of Education [FIRB, Project RISC - RBNE039XKA]. 
We acknowledge the support from the Portuguese Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT) [SFRH/S=BSAB/ 
920/ 2009] 
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 Mariotti et al., 2008). These characteristics impact on the region level of internationalization and 
on its’ firms degree of involvement in international activities (Greenaway et al., 2004; Sousa et 
al., 2000; Yli-Renko et al., 2002; Westlund and Bolton, 2003). 
Against this background, national governments have designed programs to promote the interna-
tionalization process of their firms and, consequently, of their regions. In Europe, export promo-
tion has been a prominent element in European government policies for a long time. In several 
countries, government support expanded to an active promotion of outward direct investments by 
domestic firms (European commission 2003). Financial incentives and non financial measures, in 
the form of information provision and technical assistance, have been used by home governments 
to promote or otherwise influence outward foreign direct investments (FDI) (Boletim Economico 
2002; Brewer, 1993, 1997; Duran and Ubeda, 2001; Sarmah 2003; Te Velde 2007). 
If, on the one hand, the extensive evidence on the role and efficiency of government export pro-
motion programs (e.g., Bernard and Jensen, 2001; Moini, 1998; Seringhaus and Botschen, 1991; 
Spence, 2003; Wilkinson and Brouthers, 2000) contributed greatly to inform policy makers on 
the success and success factors of the policy measures (European commission 2007b), on the 
other hand, very few studies have empirically addressed government programs explicitly de-
signed to promote more demanding forms of internationalization such as outward investment. 
Even if market failures exist that may justify government intervention, the effects of the promo-
tion of private investments using public resources needs to be further explored (Guisinger, 1992; 
Lim 1995; Loree and Guisinger, 1995, Schalk and Untiedt,  2000; Wallsten, 2000). 
The main purpose of this article is to build on previous efforts to investigate the effects of O-FDI 
promotion measures taken by governments and levels of outward foreign investment at regional 
level. We examine regional levels of outward FDI within Italy, a country with marketed regional 
asymmetries. Within the European arena, the heterogeneity of socio-economic conditions among 
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 Italian regions is a clear example of intra-border imbalances. In fact, the different growth rates 
characterizing the various areas of Italy are far from being an exception in the Union, where di-
versity across member states is a reflection of domestic socio-economic disparities strongly con-
centrated in space and reproduced over time (Kitson et al., 2004; Saxenian, 1994). 
The study allows also to investigate and to compare different types of incentives (financial and 
non-financial). Finally it provides evidences on the non-policy factors that determine the spatial 
evolution of O-FDI projects, a theme deserving careful and close attention. 
For the empirical model we use information on the population of Italian firms that received in-
centives from 2000-2007. Data, aggregated at the regional level, refers to the major public tools 
implemented to promote Italian companies’ internationalization.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the determinants of the 
internationalization of the regions. Section 3 develops the model developed to investigate the ef-
fect of several O-FDI promotion measures on regional level of internationalization. The data are 
reported in Section 4. Section 5 shows our econometric findings, while the last section concludes 
with summary remarks, policy implications and suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Determinants of the internationalization of regions 
Incentives for foreign investments are provided by industrial policies, which will also reflect on 
the level of internationalization of the region as a whole. Export promotion has been a prominent 
element in European government policies for a long time, and in several countries, government 
support expanded to an active promotion of outward direct investments among domestic firms 
(European commission, 2003). Financial incentives and non financial measures, in the firm of in-
formation provision and technical assistance, have been used by governments to promote or oth-
erwise influence outward foreign direct investments (FDI) (Brewer, 1993, 1997; Duran and 
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 Ubeda, 2001; Sarmah, 2003; Te Velde, 2007). However, little is known about whether (and how) 
government incentives to outward FDI indeed promote firms’ internationalization and whether it 
ultimately enhances regions’ level of internationalization.    
Internationalization is a process demanding substantial capabilities and resources, with the 
access to capital being a critical aspect (Westhead, Wright and Ucbasaran, 2001). Firms, SMEs in 
particular, face higher difficulties in the access to capital to finance international activities (Euro-
pean Commission, 2003; European Commission, 2009; Maeseneire and Claeys, 2007).2 In face 
of financial constraints for foreign investments, firms may not be in the right condition to make 
investments, being unable to properly exploit their initiatives or make the best investment deci-
sions, which may severely hurt their  survival and growth potential (Winker, 1999; Maeseneire 
and Claeys, 2007).  
Financial envelopes, loans and equity participation for investment projects in foreign 
countries can be implemented as proactive-external measures3 (Morgan and Katsikeas, 1997) to 
the above overcome market distortions and to reduce the costs of the investment and uncertainties 
for foreign investors (European commission, 2003; Sarmah, 2003; Te Velde, 2006; UNCTAD, 
2001) related to the foreign unfamiliar context. Through government financial support firms have 
access to capital with a lower cost, and no collateral or guarantees are required. Moreover, the in-
centive may have an indirect effect, as it may convey information about the quality of the firm 
both to the equity holders of the firm and to other potential investors facilitating access to private 
financing (Lerner, 1999). This reduces informational asymmetries and lowers the cost of internal 
and external funds, especially for firms more dependent on external finance (e.g., SMEs). Obtain-
                                                 
2 The issues in attracting capital for FDI are equivalent to those experienced by firms for financing an R&D project 
(Maeseneire and Claeys, 2007). 
3 Access to the incentive is associated with the firm's aggressive behavior and deliberate search for market opportuni-
ties overseas, but the origin of the stimulus is the external environment. 
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 ing sufficient financing serves as a cushion against unforeseen setbacks and may allow firms to 
develop (or acquire4) organizational, managerial, marketing capabilities and production capacity 
to better explore and exploit the broad range of foreign investment activities (Maeseneire and 
Claeys, 2007), which is reflected in their capacity to produce, sell, and make decisions. 
In spite of the potential benefits, financial support may also give rise to allocative inefficiencies 
in the sense that a firm that is granted support may overinvest. Supported firms may also not be 
as forced to organize themselves to improve performance as their non-supported counterparts 
(see Bergström, 2000). There are also doubts regarding the efficiency of the allocation of the in-
centives; for example, resources might be transferred to less productive firms or to firms with no 
financial constraints. Government funding may crowd out potentially profitable businesses of 
private financiers, distorting the private sector’s investment incentives (Mosselman and Prince, 
2004).  
The policy actions include also non-financial incentives (e.g. provision of information, 
technical assistance, feasibility studies). These are approached in much the same way: they seek 
to relax the limits due to bounded resources and capabilities in a company embarking on an inter-
nationalization process, especially when a large geographical, cultural and institutional distance 
exists between the home and the host country. Focused information and technical assistance are 
expected to reduce contextualisation costs and consequently to increase the odds in favour of 
success (Duran and Ubeda, 2001). Duran and Ubeda (2001) test the efficiency of Expotecnia, a 
programme of fairs showing products in various countries with a view to increasing exports and 
direct investment launched in the 1980s by the Spanish Institute for Foreign Trade. They tested if 
the firms’ probability of investing abroad changed after participating in this programme. Compa-
                                                 
4 For example, the access to funding increases a firm’s capacity to hire or purchase of external consulting and train-
ing. 
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 nies participating in these Expotecnia missions receive generic and specific information about the 
country and suitable arrangement are made for making contacts with local businessman. They 
demonstrated that the efficiency of the Expotecnia mission in affecting the propensity to invest 
depends on the degree of internationalization of the company: is low for companies having only 
exporting experience; medium for companies that have sales subsidiaries abroad; and high for 
companies with production facilities abroad. 
Based on the arguments exposed above, we raise the hypothesis that financial and non fi-
nancial incentives to outward FDI positively impacted on firms internationalization patterns and 
consequently on the region degree of internationalization.  
However, several characteristics of the home-region may play an important role in defining the 
firms’ participation in international markets and we need to account carefully for them. Accord-
ingly to recent studies the region’s likelihood of achieving international success depends to a 
large extant on structural and behavioural features of the regions themselves, which evolve 
slowly over time (Basile et al., 2003; Mariotti et al., 2008). These characteristics impact on the 
region level of internationalization and on its’ firms degree of involvement in international activi-
ties (Greenaway et al., 2004; Sousa et al., 2000).  
As far as structural determinants are concerned, the results from studies on the home 
country determinants of outward FDI, the market size and/or the degree of development of the 
regional economy may well affect the degree of involvement of the region in international mar-
kets (Olibe and Crumbley, 1997). The sectoral composition of the region is another aspects that 
may affect the region’ international presence. Technologically advanced sectors, for example, are 
generally reported in the literature as being more involved in internationalization processes (e.g. 
Hatzichronoglou, 1999). Otherwise, some countries (Like Italy with the Made in Italy sectors) 
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 reveal international comparative advantage in a number of traditional sectors (see Mariotti et al., 
2008).  
Otherwise, the degree of internationalization of the regions is likely to depend on the 
presence of leader firms. They are more likely to develop international production networks and 
implement multinational strategies. The presence of leader firms may increase the likelihood that 
the district will expand in terms of international involvement. Large firms contribute to generate 
innovation, enlarge and open makers and contribute to human capital spillovers. They may in-
duce linked local firms to grow abroad, but they may also may undertake their internationaliza-
tion efforts by acting as a protective umbrella and secure market. In this case a substitution effect 
between foreign investments made by leaser firms and by other firms in the region (Mariotti et 
al., 2008).  
From a complementary perspective, theoretical and empirical studies demonstrate that the 
presence of multinationals firm might provide a bridge to foreign markets for firms in the same 
region, as it brings in a variety of skills via both horizontal and vertical spillovers to local firms. 
A context characterised by a rich set of relationships encourages exchange of knowledge and in-
formation. This may encourage firms to expand their activities internationally. They may other-
wise appropriate local knowledge and expertise generating crowding-out or competition effect 
causing geographical close firms to decline. In this is the case, the impact of foreign presence on 
the region international growth would be negative.  
Internationalization of regions also depends on the strategic behaviour of local firms. In-
novation gives rise to proprietary advantages which enable firms to grow abroad. In general, 
firms that invest in knowledge creation are more likely to develop learning skills that are usefull 
to realize a successful growth in foreign markets (Kafouros et al., ). In this line of reasoning, we 
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 may expect regions that invest more in innovation to be better able to exploit international oppor-
tunities.  
Activities on foreign markets by local firms favour accumulation of experience, which re-
duces the information costs needed to overcome the liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1993). Mar-
ket relationships established through exports help o create conditions for firms to undertaje major 
commitments in foreign markets.  In this sense, FDI complements or substitutes for previous ex-
port relationships. Therefore, while previous high export intensity should increase the likelihood 
that regions undertake high levels of FDI, the net effect cannot be precisely determined. The exis-
tance of other exporting firms in the same region significantly increases the probability of inter-
national markets entry (Greenaway and Kneller, 2007). By means of repeated interactions firms 
gain access to various sources of knowledge (about opportunities, experimental; referral) , and 
increases firms’ propensity to undertake riskier choices. It provides opportunity for tacit and 
valuable knowledge about international business practices.    
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
3.1. Methodology and model 
We apply a methodology that allows us to identify the causal relationship between the incentive 
and its outcome (i.e., the regional intensity of internationalization), controlling for other possible 
determinants of the outcome itself (Bartik and Bingham, 1995). 
Our dependent variable is the degree of internationalization of the region measured though FDI, 
which represents part of a more generally strategy for internationalization of production. More-
over, FDI has been acknowledged more often to be complementary rather than substitute for 
other forms of internationalization. For each Italian region it has been measured the stock of FDI 
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 projects at time t in terms of the number of foreign investments (Model 1) and in term of foreign 
investment projects’ sales (Model 2).  
The uniqueness of our data in fact, allows us to consider specific data project by project of FDI.  
The evaluation of public policy then requires a model that links the target variables to the 
policy tools, taking inconsideration other non-policy determinants2, in a causal relationship 
(Duran and Ubeda, 2001). To this end, the present analysis considers home region policy and 
non-policy factors likely to affect the outward foreign investment of the firms of the region. 
By policy related variables we considered instruments launched with the aim to promote 
internationalization of firms into foreign markets.  
The regression for the outcome (i.e., degree of internationalization) as a function of the 
policy instruments (P) and other observable non-policy (NP) explanatory variables (i.e., structural 
and behavioural variables): 
                                         INTr,t = f (Pr,t, NPr,t)    
where the subscript r refers to the region and the subscript t to time and where 
The estimates of the panel data are conducted using a random effects approach. 
 
The model was run for two different dependent variables, 
(Model 1) Degree_Int_turnoverr,t is the level of internationalization measured as: total turnover 
of FDI projects on total turnover of firms, in region r and year t. 
(Model 2) Degree_Int_numberr,t is the level of internationalization measured as: the total num-
ber of FDI projects on total number of firms, in regions r and year t. 
 
where the subscript r refers to the region (r = 1, … 20) and t to time (t = 2003, … 2007). Given 
20 Italian regions and 5 years, the data set provides us with a total of 100 observations. 
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As explanatory variables we considered first the policy variables we wanted to test. Fi-
nancial support, such as venture capital funds, loans and equity participation launched for pro-
moting investment projects in foreign countries. We also account for non-financial support meas-
ures, namely information provision and technical assistance through regional organised offices 
and feasibility studies. 
Italy has been traditionally active in promoting both outward and inward FDIs and started 
to invest earlier than other European Union countries (UNCTAD, 1998). Between 2000 and 
2006, the Italian government spent more than 1,000 million euro to promote outward investment 
and export, with about three percent a year of public funds to be used for industrial policy. In par-
ticular, since the late 1990s, the major public instruments in support of outward internationaliza-
tion have been the acquisition of equity in direct investments abroad by Italian Firms (Law 
100/90; Law Decree 143/98; Law 35/05; Law 19/91); financial support to feasibility studies; 
training programmes and technical assistance for exports and direct investment abroad (Law De-
cree 143/98; Law 35/05; Ministerial Decree 136/00); the provision of financial resources for the 
creation of permanent marketing structures abroad (Law 394/81) and participation in interna-
tional tenders (Law 304/90); the stabilisation of interest rates for export credits and for capital 
goods; interest rate support on bank financing of the Italian share of investments in foreign com-
panies in which public agencies have a stake (Law Decree 143/98; Law 100/90). Two agencies 
(Simest3 and Finest4) allocate and manage venture capital funds in order to provide additional 
support to the investments in strategic non-EU markets, scout for partners and investment oppor-
tunities, and give technical and financial assistance and advice in the preparation and implemen-
tation of projects. 
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 The largest portion of financial incentives is granted by the central government; neverthe-
less, a fraction of the yearly budget is allocated by regional administrations. 
The regional distribution of the investment incentive rate (i.e., public incentives / FDIs) 
and the level of investment incentives in 2006 (i.e., in millions of euro per year) can be seen in 
Figure 1. 
“Figure 1 goes about here” 
The public intervention is much more significant for firms in Northern and Central Italy than in 
Southern Italy, while the rate is highest in Southern Italy and lowest in Northern Italy. There are 
also significant regional differences in the level of incentives. The level is highest in Lombardia 
and Emilia-Romagna (68.6 and 50.5 million euros per year, respectively). Notice also that the 
level is relatively small in Sicilia, Calabria and Basilicata (8.6, 1.0 and 8.4 million per year, re-
spectively), even though its incentive rate is very high (15.3%, 33.3% and 22.2%, respectively). 
As far the non-policy determinants considered in the model, they refer to the conceptual 
framework described in section 2. We included both structural and behavioural variables. Struc-
tural variables includes a measure of economic development, the presence of large firms within 
the region, and the presence of foreign-owned multinational corporations. 
Behavioural determinants includes region’ firms experience in international markets and 
innovation patterns. 
The role of timing in estimating impacts is very important (Venetoklis, 2001). A funda-
mental assumption that is implicitly accepted in all causality arguments is that public intervention 
precedes the dependent variable in occurrence. A time lag between the public intervention and 
the measurement of expected impacts assures that causal relationships have time to evolve. In 
many cases, it is not clear when the effects of an incentive begin to unfold (Venetoklis, 2001). 
For example, firms expecting to receive a subsidy could anticipate their investment plans before 
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 the incentive is disbursed. As in the observed financial incentive allocations, public intervention 
often overlaps with the investment implementation (e.g., equity participation and venture capital 
funds), we assume a null time lag between financial incentive allocation and investment, while a 
time lag equal to one for the provision of information and the technical assistance. Moreover the 
rates of change of structural and behavioural variables are typically much slower those that of 
pure policy variables, consequently, most non-policy variables are based on the Firm Census car-
ried out by the Italian national statistical service (ISTAT) in 2001.  
 
Hence, the two models accounting for lagged variables take the following form:  
Pr,t = Equity_participationr,t Venture_capital_fundsr,t Incentive_commercialr,t-1 Incen-
tive_feasibility_studyr,t-1 Incentive_technical_assistancer,t-1 Reg_subsidiesr,t-1 Reg_servicer,t-1 
NPr,t = International_leaderr,t, Experiencer,t, Leaderr,t, Innovationr,t, GDP r,t, Northr,t, Advancedr, 
Made_italyr 
For a detailed description and definition of policy and non-policy variables see Table 1.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
The dataset employed in the empirical analysis combines several sources of data:  
1) Reprint provides a census of outward and inward FDI in Italy since 1986. It is updated 
yearly, and it is sponsored by the Italian Institute for Foreign Trade. 
2) Four Overseas Trade Ministry annual reports and annual publications collect information on 
Italian industrial policy between 2002 and 2006. 
3) Simest and Finest public agencies’ balance sheets provide information about the assignment 
of financial incentives (i.e., equity participation and venture capital funds) to Italian firms 
throughout the period 2003-2007. 
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 4) Istat census data report structural characteristics of the Italian regions in 2001, and annual 
Istat publications provide data on Italian export activities between 2000 and 2006. 
5) The EP-CESPRI database, developed by Cespri Università Bocconi, provides information on 
patents applied for at the European Patent Office (EPO) since 1978. The EP-CESPRI data-
base is based upon applications published on a regular basis by the Espacenet Bulletin and is 
updated yearly. 
The data sources are detailed in Table 2 . 
Insert table 2 about here 
 
4. ECONOMETRIC FINDINGS 
This section presents the estimates of the proposed models for the degree of internationalization 
of Italian regions between 2000 and 2006 (Table 3). 
Insert table 3 about here 
Among the different policy instruments, financial support through equity participation and re-
gional incentive to internationalization seem to be most effective showing a positive effect on re-
gional internationalization level in both models ( Equity_Participation shows a coefficient that is 
positive and significantly different from zero at p< 0.01; Regional_incentive shows a coefficient 
that is positive and significantly different from zero at p< 0.01 in Model 2).  
The resources spent with information provision and technical assistance through regional organ-
ised offices do not seem to have had a direct and significant effect on the level of regional FDI 
projects. Regional_service appears as positive and significant only for Model 2.  
The remaining instruments have a non significant coefficient in both Model 1 and 2. 
As far as the regions’ structural variables are concerned, both the preence of leader firms and of  
foreign firms promote international expansion of regions.  
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 As far as the behavioural variables are concerned, innovation seems to promote regional interna-
tionalization. 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The evaluation of public intervention has recently been the subject of an increasing number of 
studies. Moreover in the developed and developing countries, a number of policy changes oc-
curred and a number of measures have been launched by the Governments to encourage outward 
FDI flows (UNCTAD, 2003). So far there has been no systematic discussion or quantification of 
Home country measures to promote outward FDI. Our survey through the existing literature re-
veals that not only Home country measures to promote outward FDI are much less discussed than 
other factors affecting FDI, as also their effectiveness and efficiency have never been studied in 
detail. 
The paper aims at filling this gap and it offers an empirical contribution in order to discuss the ef-
fectiveness of different public measures to firms’ O-FDI. In particular we construct an original 
longitudinal dataset on Home country measures to promote outward FDI granted by the Italian 
Government. The novelty of our study is in the emphasis on the role played by public policy tools 
in determining the degree of internationalization of a region. In particular, our study examines the 
effect of different types of public measures addressing firms’ internationalization and provides 
useful suggestions to policy makers for the design of appropriate incentives and the improvement 
of existing ones. 
Despite the limited extension of the time frame in our sample, the empirical findings are in line 
with the theoretical hypotheses: public incentives are key for promoting outward investments, 
and they have to be seen in the broader context of the determinants of FDIs. The findings confirm 
that financial incentives through equity participation and other financial incentives allocated at 
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 regional level may have helped firms overcome their financial constraints and compensate for 
uncertainty and risk related to the foreign context. The non-financial services do not seem to be 
have had an important and significant effect.  
There is no need to point out that the results should be taken with proper care, since we simply do 
not know what would have happened had the aid not existed. Additionally, we should also take 
care when considering the possible crowding-out effects that the Home country measures to pro-
mote outward FDI may have had on private initiatives.  
Concluding, our results support Te Velde (2007), Unctad (2001) and Samah (2003) postion that 
the influence of Home country measures to promote outward FDI can be increased through tailor-
made approaches and regional and country targeting; on the formulation and administration of 
measures, as well as the extent to which they complement host country measures and firm level 
barriers for O-FDI. 
Bearing in mind the novelty of the subject, the future agenda could expand the analysis on the ef-
fectiveness of outward public policies. First of all, the effectiveness of Home country measures to 
promote outward FDI can, and does, vary from industry to industry. We therefore suggest that fu-
ture investigations should take into account inter-industry differences. Secondly, this paper dem-
onstrates the effectiveness of outward investment incentives but does not compare social costs 
and benefits. The finding that outward policy tools are effective by no means implies that they 
raise the home country’s social welfare. It is also important to note the importance of incorporat-
ing both intended effects such as additionality and unintentional effects such as displacement 
(Lenihan, 2004) and indirect effects. 
In conclusion, the findings of this paper seem to justify greater research efforts in the area of in-
centive for outward internationalization and there is ample scope for further research on measur-
ing and assessing the effectiveness of public measures towards O-FDI. 
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  Description  
Policy variables  
Equity_participationr,t 
Total amount (€) of financial incentives (i.e., acquisition of equity 
interests in Italian firms’ direct investment abroad) in year t and 
region r 
Total amount (€) of venture capital funds set up by the Government 
to support investments in areas such as the Far East, Eastern 
Europe, the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East and Central and 
South America in year t and region r 
Venture_capital_fundsr,t 
Total amount (€) of financial incentives for the creation of perma-
nent commercial structures abroad in year t-1 and region r Incentive_commercialr,t-1
 
Total amount (€) of advice in feasibility studies  in year t-1 and re-
gion r Incentive_feasibility_studyr,t-1 
Total amount (€) of advice in technical assistance  in year t-1 and 
region r Incentive_technical_assistancer,t-1 
Total amount (€) of regional incentive to FDIs and export in year t-
1 and region r Reg_subsidiesr,t-1 
Dummy variable equal to 1 in the region r in year t-1 if public in-
formation service is provided Reg_servicer,t-1 
  
Non Policy variables (Structural and behavioral) 
  
Ratio of the number of employees in foreign affiliates of firms with 
over 250 employees in region r in year t and the number of em-
ployees in the leader firms located in the same region in 2001 
International_leaderr,t 
Number of years elapsing from when region r reached 50% of the 
number of employees engaged in foreign activities in year t Experiencer,t 
Incidence of firms with more than 250 employees on the total 
number of firms in the region r in 2001 Leaderr 
Number of patents in region r in year t Innovationr,t-2 
Gross domestic product in region r and year t GDPr,t 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the region r is located in Northern of 
Italy Northr 
Ratio of the number of firms in advanced industries in region r and 
the number of firms located in the same region in 2001 Advanced 
Ratio of the number of firms in made in Italy industries in region r  
and the number of firms located in the same region in 2001 Made_italy 
 
 
 
Table 1: Description of the independent variables
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  Source Laws Years 
 
Dependent Variables   
Degree_Int_number REPRINT Database  2003-2007 
Degree_Int_turnover REPRINT Database  2003-2007 
    
Explanatory Variables 
Policy variables  
Equity_participation SIMEST and FINEST balance sheets 
Law 100/90 
Law Decree 
143/98 
Law 35/05 
Law 19/91 
2002-2006 
Venture_capital_fund 
Ministero Commercio 
Internazionale, Direzione 
Generale per le Politiche per 
l’Internazionalizzazione 
Venture 
Capital Funds 2002-2006 
Incentive_commercial Ministero Commercio Internazionale su dati SIMEST Law 394/81 2002-2006 
Incentive_feasibility_study 
Osservatorio Economico 
Ministero Commercio 
Internazionale su dati SIMEST 
Law Decree 
143/98 
Law 35/05 
Ministerial De-
cree 136/00 
2002-2006 
Incentive_technical_assistance 
Osservatorio Economico 
Ministero Commercio 
Internazionale su dati SIMEST 
Law Decree 
143/98 
Law 35/05 
Ministerial De-
cree 136/00 
2002-2006 
Regional_incentive 
Elaborazioni MET su dati 
Ministero delle Attività 
Produttive 
Regional Law 2002-2006 
Regional_service Region desk Regional_Law 2002-2006 
    
Non Policy variables  (Structural and behavioral) 
International_leader REPRINT Database  2003-2007 
Experience REPRINT Database  2000-2007 
Leader ISTAT Census Data  2001 
Innovation EP-Cespri Database  2001-2005 
GDP ISTAT  2003-2007 
North   2003-2007 
Advanced ISAT  2001 
Made_italy ISTAT  2001 
    
 
Table 2: Sources of data for dependent and explanatory variables 
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 MODEL 1 Degree_Int_turnover 
MODEL 2 
Degree_Int_number 
 Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
    
Policy Variables     
Equity_participation 0.0020*** (0.0004) 1.83e-05*** (4.22e-06) 
Venture_capital_fund -0.0009 (0.0010) -2.92e-06 (1.06e-05) 
Incentive_commercial 0.0007 (0.0005) -7.77e-06 (5.53e-06) 
Incentive_feasibility_study 0.0062 (0.0044) -2.86e-05 (4.48e-05) 
Incentive_technical_assistance 0.0023 (0.0078) 3.87e-05 (7.80e-05) 
Regional_incentive 0.0004 (0.0015) 5.96e-05*** (1.63e-05) 
Regional_service -0.0036 (0.0072) 0.0002** (0.0008) 
     
Non Policy Variables   
International_leader 0.1080*** (0.0331) 0.0016** (0.0006) 
Experience 0.0014 (0.0014) 1.25e-05 (2.05e-05) 
Leader 232.4000*** (53.9000) 3.1750** (1.4230) 
Innovation 1.68e-05* (9.51e-06) 2.10e-07* (1.19e-07) 
GDP -2.75e-06 (2.82e-06) 5.97e-08 (6.68e-08) 
North -0.0318 (0.0252) 0.0015** (0.0006) 
Advanced -1.49e-06** (7.39e-07) -1.36e-08 (1.18e-08) 
Made_italy -9.98e-08 (2.71e-07) 1.40e-08** (7.11e-09) 
Constant -0.0519 (0.0406) -0.00184* (0.000982) 
     
 Number of observ. = 100 Number of observ. = 100 
 Number of groups = 20 Number of groups = 20 
 P>chi2 = 0.000 P>chi2 = 0.000 
 R-sq: Within = 0.6206 R-sq: Within = 0.4005 
           Between = 0.9199           Between = 0.7201 
           Overall =0.9173           Overall = 0.7026 
 Sigma_u = 0.0008 Sigma_u = 0.0231 
 Sigma_e = 0.0002 Sigma_e = 0.0163 
 Rho = 0.9520 Rho = 0.6672 
 
Table 3: Results of the random effects GLS regression 
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Figure 1: Public incentive rate and level at the regional level, 2006 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 An extensive literature (surveyed in Dunning and Lundan, 2008) documents the presence of spillovers: 
over time, domestic MNEs create new jobs, raise the level of wages and carry out R&D activities. 
2 For a thorough review of the literature concerning the determinants of FDI, see Dunning and Lundan 
(2008) and Mariotti et al., 2008). 
3 Simest is the largest institution for Italian businesses abroad, and it administers various forms of public 
support for the internationalization of the Italian economy. Simest was set up as a limited company in 
1990 (Law 100/1990). It is a public-private partnership controlled by the Ministry of International Trade 
and Commerce (76%), while private shareholders include banks and industrial business organisations. The 
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primary objective of Simest is to promote the competitiveness of the Italian industry and the service sector 
by providing funding and advice to business outward investments. 
4 Finest was founded in 1992 pursuant to Italian National Law 19/1991 as an investment company that 
promotes economic co-operation with Eastern European countries. The main shareholders of Finest are 
the Regional Governments of Friuli Venezia Giulia and Veneto, the Autonomous Province of Trento (lo-
cal public administrations of North East of Italy) and Simest. Finest provides its assistance to all compa-
nies whose headquarters are located in north eastern Italy (i.e., Friuli Venezia Giulia, Veneto and Trentino 
Alto Adige regions). Finest collaborates with companies to create or expand their businesses in foreign 
countries or to set up industrial and commercial relations with firms in target areas. 
